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This paper tests the prediction of three discrete asymmetric duopoly price competition games in
the laboratory. The games differ from each other in terms of the size of the cost asymmetry that
induces a systematic variation in the difference between the firms’ marginal costs. While the
standard theory requires the low-cost firm to set a price just equal to the high cost firm's marginal
cost, which is identical across all three games, and win the entire market; intuition suggests that
market price may increase with a decrease in the absolute difference between the two marginal
costs. We develop a quantal response equilibrium model to test our competing conjecture.
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1. Introduction
The study of price competition is an important foundation of oligopoly theory and remains
a staple of all microeconomics textbooks. Of all models of price competition, perhaps the most
celebrated is the one in which symmetric duopolists engage in a price war that leads to
competitive pricing (Bertrand, 1883). Subsequent theoretical and experimental studies have
almost exclusively examined predictive power of the symmetric Bertrand-Nash equilibrium and
in turn have spawned a sizeable literature.1 As a result, our knowledge about the predictive
power of asymmetric Bertrand-Nash equilibrium remains markedly limited. In this study we
address this limitation by designing a laboratory experiment that tests prescriptive accuracy of
the duopoly price competition model characterized by asymmetric costs of production.
The Nash equilibrium solution for the symmetric duopoly model recommends that two
firms charge a price equal to the common marginal cost of production (Tirole, 1988, p. 210).
When duopolists have commonly known but dissimilar marginal costs of production (c1  c2),
Nash equilibrium solution prescribes that the low-cost firm charge a price just equal to c2, steal
the entire market and earn a total profit of (c2 – c1), provided that pm(c1) ≥ c2 (Tirole, 1988, p.
211). The high-cost firm receives zero profit in this equilibrium.2

1

The symmetric Bertrand-Nash equilibrium solution has generated a string of theoretical studies that report an
inconsistency between the equilibrium prediction and observations from the real markets, which is known in the
literature as the Bertrand paradox. The theoretical literature has advanced along two lines. First, it has been argued
that certain assumptions that underlie the prediction are not realistic (Kreps and Scheinkman, 1983; Friedman, 1977;
Hotelling, 1929; and Edgeworth, 1925). The second line of investigation has questioned the game-theoretic
foundations of the Bertrand reasoning (Bowley, 1924). Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000) and Fouraker and Siegel
(1963) are two notable experimental studies that have tested the prediction of the symmetric model.
2

Blume (2003) develops a theory of duopoly price competition with asymmetric (constant) marginal costs,
homogenous products, and continuous strategy space and shows that there exists an equilibrium in undominated
strategies in which the low-cost firm sets a price equal to c2. Following Blume (2003) we derive the equilibrium for
all of our games in the next section. While Blume (2003) uses the standard rationing rule of equal split to break a tie,
Baye and Morgan (2004) shows how a continuous strategy model is sensitive to the choice of a tie-breaking rule.

The primary objective of our study is to test the above classic prediction of the
asymmetric model. To achieve this goal, we develop three experimental games of asymmetric
duopoly price competition. The three games are comprised of an identical discrete strategyspace; however, they differ from each other in terms of the size of the cost asymmetry that
induces a systematic variation in the difference between c2 and c1 (c2 – c1 > 0), holding c2 fixed.
We test the Nash equilibrium prediction of these games, which is identical in all of them, under a
perfect-stranger matching protocol that allows a group of paired participants to play each game
only once. At the same time, we repeat each game for 20 rounds.3 The advantage of such a
design is that it retains the one nature of the theory while insulating behavior from incentives for
cooperation and reciprocity, but at the same time allowing for experience. If participants choose
as per the equilibrium solution, then play can be expected to converge to the same equilibrium
price of c2 in all three games, discussed in detail in Section 2.
However, we suspect that market price may increase with a decrease in the absolute
difference between the two marginal costs, as is the case in our games. This suspicion stems
from our uneasiness with a crucial assumption that underlies the asymmetric Bertrand-Nash
prediction. That is, the low-cost firm will charge c2, no matter however small the difference
between the firms’ marginal cost is. However, the nature of this prediction seems to go against a
simple economic intuition that a smaller cost asymmetry might cause the low-cost firm to set
prices higher than c2. This is because when (c2 – c1) becomes smaller, the cost of departure from
the above equilibrium strategy or the profit from sticking to the equilibrium strategy of c2
becomes considerably smaller for the low-cost firm. As a result, the low-cost firm’s inclination
to react to monetary incentives the way the standard model predicts diminishes as (c2 – c1)

3

There is a large literature on incorporating learning into models of adjustment in games that are played repeatedly
with different partners. See Fudenberg and Levine (1998) for a survey.
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decreases.4 More generally, a gradual reduction in (c2 – c1) may weaken the predictive power of
the asymmetric Bertrand-Nash solution. Accordingly, we conjecture that market price may
increase with a decrease in the absolute difference between the two marginal costs.5
To theoretically account for our conjecture, we develop a decision-error model based on
the notion of Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) á la McKelvey and Palfrey (1995). Our
model incorporates boundedly rational choice in that players choose better responses with higher
probabilities, but may not necessarily choose the best response with probability one. More
precisely, the choice probabilities for strategies are proportional to the expected payoffs
associated with such strategies. Within this framework, we include an error parameter μ that
determines how sensitive behavior is with respect to payoffs. Depending on μ, completely
random behavior and the aforementioned equilibrium appear as different limiting cases in our
model. Using this framework, we derive a prediction that captures the essence of our conjecture.
The experimental literature on the asymmetric Bertrand model is thin. Argenton and
Mueller (2012) study symmetric and asymmetric Bertrand duopolies with convex cost
conditions. Their experiment consists of 40 rounds and follows a fixed-matching protocol. After

In the extreme case when (c2 – c1) = 0, Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000) find the market price to be considerably
higher than the common marginal cost in the symmetric duopoly model. We also test a symmetric model of duopoly
price competition as a control treatment.
4

5

The aforementioned idea that the drawing power of Nash equilibrium depends on the associated costs of departures
is not novel. A few experimental papers demonstrate that a change in payoff structure, which in turn changes costs
of departure from equilibrium prediction, can produce a considerable inconsistency between theoretical predictions
and behavior in the lab (see Goeree and Holt, 2001 for a list of such games). Dufwenberg et al. (2007) consider twoand four-player symmetric price competition games in the presence of varying levels of price floor and
experimentally test the standard Nash prediction that a lower price floor would lead to lower market price. Capra et
al. (2002) consider duopoly price competition games in the presence of meet-or-release contracts between firms and
buyers. Price competition, however, is imperfect in their case in the sense that market share of the high-price firm is
not zero. They test the Nash prediction that price levels should be independent of market share of the high-price
firm. Both studies argue that the associated Nash prediction runs counter to simple economic intuitions and report a
systematic disagreement between the respective Nash prediction and the data. Each study attributes the failure of the
standard theory to the crucial assumption underlying the Nash prediction that players respond optimally to any
potential gain in profit, no matter however small. To reconcile the data with the economic intuition, each study
develops an equilibrium model of noisy behavior that assumes that players’ decision to play the respective Nash
strategy may critically depend on costs of departure from the equilibrium.

3

the conclusion of each round, each pair is presented with a summary screen displaying its own
price choices. They do not find any evidence of symmetric markets being more collusive than
asymmetric markets. In fact, for some measures of collusion, they find that firms in their
asymmetric treatments come closer to the cartel profit. Unlike them, we investigate asymmetric
duopoly games with constant cost conditions under a perfect-stranger matching protocol.
Boone et al. (2012) study asymmetric price competition in duopoly and triopoly markets.
They explore two types of triopoly markets: one in which all firms have different marginal costs
and another in which two of the three firms share the lowest marginal cost. In each experimental
session, the market size and role of each participant in each round are determined quasirandomly such that within each session each participant is assigned each of the 7 possible firmroles for 8 rounds. Thus, each session implements a within-subject design and consists of 56
rounds. In each session, firms’ marginal costs are randomly assigned. At the end of each round,
each participant is shown costs and prices in his/her own market and his/her own profit. Boone
et al. find that market price converges to the Nash prediction in the duopoly and triopoly markets
where all firms have different marginal costs. Also, market price stays above the predicted level
in the triopoly market where two of the three firms share the lowest marginal cost.
There exists some important differences between our study and Boone et al. Boone et al.
do not vary the size of the cost asymmetry, allow repeated interaction among firms under a
random-matching protocol, adopt a within-subject design and induce random assignment of
costs. In comparison, we vary the size of the cost asymmetry, allow repeated interaction among
firms but adopt a perfect-stranger matching protocol, implement a between-subject design and
induce fixed assignment of costs.6,7
6

We became aware of Argenton and Mueller (2012) and Boone et al. (2012) after an anonymous referee brought
these studies to our attention.
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Keser (1993) experimentally studies a repeated Bertrand duopoly game with asymmetric
costs and ‘demand inertia’. She reports a tendency toward more cooperative behavior when
participants are experienced with the game. Our objective is clearly different from that of
Keser’s. We aim to provide a direct test of one-shot asymmetric model, while abstaining away
from the issue of demand inertia.
The experimental literature on the symmetric Bertrand model is rather large. Dufwenberg
and Gneezy (2000) and Fouraker and Siegel (1963) show with random- and fixed-matching
protocol, respectively, that duopolies are more likely to sustain collusive prices than triopolies
with “maximum” information feedback (all price choices shown after each round of play).8
Abbink and Brandts (2008) experimentally examine symmetric price competition games
characterized by increasing marginal costs. They find that only duopolies can sustain collusive
prices due to a remarkable degree of price coordination between sellers. Baye and Morgan
(2004) is the first study that uses data from the Internet markets to test the competitive prediction
of the classic (symmetric) Bertrand model and finds that sellers on the Internet do not price as
per the Nash prediction.9

7

It is difficult to identify a particular design choice of Boone et al. (2012) that can explain the differences in
behavior between Boone et al. (2012) and our study. It may be a combination of design issues that have produced
competitive behavior in their duopoly treatment. It may be that large number of repetitions of the stage game and
within-subject protocol are instrumental in bringing about competitive outcomes in their duopoly treatment. Boone
et al. let subjects play close variations of the asymmetric game for 56 rounds in a within-subject design, which
provides more opportunities for learning. In contrast, we repeat the stage game only 20 rounds in a between-subject
design, thus providing fewer opportunities for learning.
8

Later, Dufwenberg et al. (2007) and Dugar (2007) confirm the main result of Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000).

9

There exist a few studies that experimentally investigate the issue of asymmetric cost conditions by focusing on
quantity competition. Mason et al. (1997, 1992) and Rassenti et al. (2000) focus on the Cournot competition with
asymmetric costs. Mason et al. (1992) find that industry outputs are significantly higher in asymmetric than in
symmetric markets. Rassenti et al. (2000) consider five-firm oligopolies with asymmetric costs and report that the
firm level play is inconsistent with the Nash prediction; however the aggregate play pattern is in agreement with the
Nash prediction. One should note that the results obtained in the Cournot setting does not necessarily imply that the
same results would also be obtained in the Bertrand framework, since the underlying intuitions of quantity vs. price
competition differ a great deal (see Tirole, 1988, p. 207-208 for an overview).

5

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 derives the Nash
equilibrium and QRE prediction for all our games. Section 3 lays out the experimental design.
Section 4 reports the results. Section 5 provides a summary.

2. Theory
We begin by presenting a generic duopoly price competition game with asymmetric
costs. In particular, our discretized generic game is based on a version of the classic one-shot
Bertrand model of price competition introduced by Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000). Suppose
that each firm simultaneously and independently chooses a price from the set {1, 2, 3, … , 50}.
Firm 1 has a constant marginal cost of c1, whereas firm 2’s constant marginal cost is c2. We
assume c1  c2. On the demand side, there is a perfectly informed single buyer who purchases
exactly one unit of the product from the lowest priced firm and this demand is inelastic up to the
reservation value of the buyer, which is equal to 50. The firm choosing the lowest price receives
a total profit equal to the lowest market price less its own constant marginal cost; the higher
priced firm earns zero profit. In case of a tie, each firm’s total profit is equal to half of the
difference between the common market price and the firm specific constant marginal cost.10
We assign three sets of values to the cost pair (c1, c2) and thereby generate three games.
The experimental design is developed around these games. The pair (c1, c2) assumes the values
(8, 11), (6, 11), and (4, 11) in the Small-Diff, Medium-Diff, and Large-Diff games, respectively.
Given the cost and demand parameters, in each game the classic equilibrium prediction in prices

10

The above game, inspired by Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000), captures the following assumptions of a simple
Bertrand model with asymmetric costs: firms sell homogeneous products using a constant-returns to scale
production function; marginal cost for each firm is therefore constant; the production technologies, however, vary
between the firms; there are no capacity constraints; production is instantaneous; and there is no cost or demand
uncertainty. The cost conditions are also common knowledge among the firms. This is a model of complete, but
imperfect information. Complete, because each player is informed about payoff information (costs, buyer
reservation value) for all players; imperfect, because prices are selected simultaneously.

6

is (c2, c2+1); with the firm having a unit cost of c1 charging a price of c2 and the other firm
charging a price of (c2+1). In the above equilibrium, the low-cost firm’s profit is positive,
whereas the profit of the high-cost firm is zero. Table 1 presents an overview of the Nash
predictions and the associated payoff for each game.11
Blume (2003) examines Bertrand competition with continuous strategy space,
homogenous products and different marginal costs and shows that for small enough η > 0, the
following is an equilibrium: The low-cost firm posts a price equal to c2, and the high-cost firm
randomizes uniformly over [c2, c2+η]. Blume argues that from a continuum of equilibria, the case
in which the low-cost firm sets a price equal to c2 represents the only equilibrium in undominated
strategies. Owing to discretization in our games, η = 1, and as a result Blume predicts (c2, c2+1)
as the only Nash equilibrium in undominated strategies.12 For the remainder of this study, we
will refer to each player’s strategy in the above equilibrium as the undominated equilibrium
strategy (UES).
Next, we develop a QRE model for a continuous version of the asymmetric price
competition game discussed above to account for our conjecture that market price may increase
with a decrease in the absolute difference between the two marginal costs. 13 The QRE approach
allows for noisy-best responses instead of perfect rationality assumption of the Nash equilibrium

11

In each game, the set of rationalizable strategies for firm 1 is

c1 + 2,c1 + 3,...,v,

c1 +1,c1 + 2,...,v −1 and

for firm 2 is

where v stands for the buyer’s maximum willingness to pay. For a definition of

rationalizability, see Chapter 4 of Osborne and Rubinstein (1994).
Aside from discretization, the only other difference between
 Blume’s game and ours is that Blume describes a
continuously decreasing demand schedule faced by the firms, whereas we present a unitary demand schedule that is
inelastic up to the reservation value of the buyer.
12



13

Although our experiment tests the predictions of the asymmetric games with a discrete strategy-space, the
decision-error model we develop involves a continuum strategy-space.
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concept (Anderson et al., 2002).14 The noise in the QRE models may arise due to preference
shocks, experimentation, updating of beliefs, or actual mistakes in judgment.
To account for noisy decision-making, we assume that each firm best responds with an
error to its rival’s price choice. The expected profit for firm i is given by
𝜋𝑖𝑒 (𝑝) = (𝑝 − 𝐶𝑖 )

[1
⏟ − 𝐹𝑗 (𝑝)]

, 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗, 𝑝 ∈ [𝑃, 𝑃]

(1)

𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏 𝑖 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑠 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡

where 𝑝 = price charged by the ith firm, 𝐶𝑖 = (symmetric) constant average cost of the ith firm,
𝐹𝑗 (. ) = cumulative distribution of the jth firm’s price choice (𝑓𝑗 (. ) being the corresponding
density).15 The logit choice density (with error parameter 𝜇) for each i is given by
𝑓𝑖 (𝑝) =

exp[𝜋𝑖𝑒 (𝑝)⁄𝜇]

(2)

𝑃

∫𝑃 exp[𝜋𝑖𝑒 (𝑦)⁄𝜇]𝑑𝑦

The denominator of the right hand side of (2) is a constant such that the density integrates to one.
Equation (2) states that the choice density is increasing in a firm’s expected payoff. Note that
when the error parameter 𝜇 tends to infinity, the equilibrium choice probabilities are drawn from
a uniform distribution, which indicates a completely random pricing behavior by firms. In the
other extreme situation, when the error parameter 𝜇 tends to zero, the equilibrium choice

14

There are a few other approaches to explaining departures from Nash prediction. For example, one approach
relaxes the assumption of perfect rationality (Akerlof and Yellen, 1985), while other approaches consider concepts
of e-equilibria (Radner, 1980) or probabilistic choice models of boundedly rational behavior (Rosenthal, 1989). Still,
some other approaches are based on models that limit players’ capacity for introspection (see, for example, Nagel,
1995; Stahl and Wilson, 1995).
15

Baye and Morgan (2004) investigate symmetric Bertrand competition in experimental duopoly, triopoly and
quadropoly markets. Their main goal is to analyze the incidence of dispersion in posted prices at a price comparison
website on the Internet, as well as in the laboratory. They use three different equilibrium concepts, including the
QRE for their purposes. We, in contrast, focus on how an introduction of asymmetry in the cost structure between
firms impacts price choices in experimental duopoly markets. There is an important technical difference between
our study and that of Baye and Morgan insofar the QRE model is concerned. In their study the posted price can lie
between (and including) the common unit cost and the monopoly price, whereas in our study the posted price can be
lower than a firm’s own cost. We thank an anonymous referee for drawing our attention to the study by Baye and
Morgan.
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probabilities generate a mass-point, signifying Nash equilibrium behavior. These two limiting
cases are consistent with the models presented in Capra et al. (2002) and Anderson et al. (2002).
For each i the logit differential equation is obtained by differentiating (2) with respect to
p and rearranging terms.
′

𝜇𝑓𝑖′ (𝑝) = 𝜋𝑖𝑒 (𝑝)𝑓𝑖 (𝑝)

(3)

Equation (3) indicates a basic property of the logit equilibrium (see Anderson et al., 2002, p. 25):
that when the expected payoff function is increasing, the choice density of decisions is also
increasing in equilibrium. Equation (3) can be modified to include the cost parameter as
𝜇𝑓𝑖′ (𝑝) = [{1 − 𝐹𝑗 (𝑝)} − (𝑝 − 𝐶𝑖 )𝑓𝑗 (𝑝)]𝑓𝑖 (𝑝)

(4)

′

where the term 𝜋𝑖𝑒 (𝑝) in (3) is substituted by differentiating (1) with respect to 𝑝. Equation (4)
provides a differential equation for the equilibrium choice density. The existence of a logit
equilibrium for this set up is ensured by proposition 1 in Anderson et al. (2002).
We can rewrite (4) as
𝑑𝐹𝑗 (𝑝)
𝑑2 𝐹𝑖 (𝑝) 𝑑𝐹𝑖 (𝑝)
1
⁄
= [{1 − 𝐹𝑗 (𝑝)} − (𝑝 − 𝐶𝑖 )
]
2
𝑑𝑝
𝑑𝑝
µ
𝑑𝑝

Integrating both sides with respect to 𝑝, one can obtain
𝑑𝐹𝑗 (𝑝)
𝑑𝐹𝑖 (𝑝)
1
𝑑(𝑝 − 𝐶𝑖 ) 𝑑𝐹𝑗 (𝑝)
ln (
) = [∫ 𝑑𝑝 − ∫ 𝐹𝑗 (𝑝)𝑑𝑝 − [(𝑝 − 𝐶𝑖 ) ∫
𝑑𝑝 − ∫ {
∫
𝑑𝑝} 𝑑𝑝]] + 𝑘
𝑑𝑝
µ
𝑑𝑝
𝑑𝑝
𝑑𝑝

In the above equation, k is an integration-constant. In two steps, this equation can be further
simplified to
ln (

⇒

𝑑𝐹𝑖 (𝑝)
1
) = [𝑝 − ∫ 𝐹𝑗 (𝑝)𝑑𝑝 − [(𝑝 − 𝐶𝑖 )𝐹𝑗 (𝑝) − ∫{1. 𝐹𝑗 (𝑝)}𝑑𝑝]] + 𝑘
𝑑𝑝
µ

𝑝 − (𝑝 − 𝐶𝑖 )𝐹𝑗 (𝑝)
𝑑𝐹𝑖 (𝑝)
= 𝑓𝑖 (𝑝) = 𝐾 𝑒𝑥𝑝 [
]
𝑑𝑝
𝜇
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where 𝐾 = exp(𝑘) is a positive constant. Letting 𝑖 be the low-cost firm (L) and and 𝑗 be the high-cost
firm (H), respectively, the last equation modifies to
⇒

𝑑𝐹𝐿 (𝑝)
𝑝 − (𝑝 − 𝐶𝐿 )𝐹𝐻 (𝑝)
= 𝑓𝐿 (𝑝) = 𝐾 𝑒𝑥𝑝 [
]
𝑑𝑝
𝜇

(5)

The following proposition predicts how, under the logit equilibrium, a change in 𝐶𝐿 impacts the
low-cost firm’s equilibrium choice density.

Proposition 1: In a logit equilibrium, an increase in 𝐶𝐿 results in the low-cost firm posting
higher prices, in the sense of first-degree stochastic dominance.16
Proof: See Appendix.

Being equipped with the standard prediction and the prediction of the QRE model for our
games, Section 3 develops experimental environments that are designed to test these predictions.

3. Experimental Procedure
The experimental sessions were conducted at a large Canadian University’s experimental
economics laboratory during 2010-2011. Four sessions were conducted for each of the three
treatments: Small-Diff, Medium-Diff, and Large-Diff. 40 undergraduate students took part in each
session. Special care was taken to make sure that none of the students took part in more than one
session. Each session lasted for about an hour. The participants were given sufficient time to
fully understand the instructions and all of their queries were answered before they made their
first decision. There was no practice round. At the start of each session 40 participants were
randomly matched into groups of two to form 20 duopoly markets. In each session, the same

16

A seemingly similar result can be found in the second part of the Corollary presented in Dufwenberg et al. (2007),
who study symmetric competition with price floors. The similarity can be noticeable if we compare the price floor in
their study with the low-cost firm’s unit cost in ours. The text in the proposition is patterned after that Corollary.
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game was repeated for 20 rounds. We employed the perfect-stranger matching protocol. Under
this protocol, each participant competed in price with a new counterpart in every round. Thus, 20
new duopoly markets were formed in each of the 20 rounds in a session. At the beginning of the
first round, each participant was randomly assigned either the role of a “low-cost type” or a
“high-cost type”, and this role remained fixed throughout a session.17
After the completion of each round, each participant was notified of only his/her and
counterpart’s price choices and his/her own profit. Communication amongst the participants was
strictly prohibited. In each round the participants were rewarded in terms of points and at the end
of the session all such points earned by a participant were added up and the total was converted
into Canadian dollars at an exchange rate of $1.00 per 8 points. Note that with this exchange rate,
a participant who was a “low-cost type” would earn $0.38, $0.63, and $0.88 per round in the
Small-Diff, Medium-Diff, and Large-Diff treatment, respectively, assuming that the low-cost firm
played its UES and the high-cost firm played any strategy weakly higher than its UES.
The experiment was fully computerized with the Z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007).
Each participant received an instruction sheet at the beginning of each session. Each instruction
sheet had a registration number written at the top that identified him/her during a session. The
computer screen also showed each participant’s registration number and the cost type. In each
round each participant recorded his/her price choice by writing down a number from the price set
{1, 2, 3,… , 50} in a space provided on the computer screen. Each participant was presented with
a payoff table that described his/her own payoff as a function of the two price choices and his/her

17

Although it is usually considered a good practice to avoid references to any economic or market terms, we have
used “high” and “low” cost types in the instructions. There is no reason to believe that these terms are emotive
enough to introduce unobserved personal preferences or aversions for particular player types and thereby may have
influenced participants’ choices. Moreover, the initial cost-type assignment was random so there is no reason for a
specific seller-type to develop a sense of unfairness against us, the experimenter. See Davis and Holt (1993, p. 27)
for a discussion on possible tradeoffs between emotive terms and economic behavior.
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own cost type.18 In all sessions, each participant started with an initial endowment of $7 (56
points) to cover any possible losses. Note that a participant could incur a loss in our experiment
if s/he won or tied in a round and made some specific price choices. However, no such case was
observed in any of the sessions. At the conclusion of the experiment, each participant’s earning
was computed by adding up the initial endowment and the net profits made. To prevent any
possible post-play side payments, we paid participants sequentially with sufficient time gap
between any two of them.
At this point, our experimental design choices deserve a careful discussion. First, we
employed the perfect-stranger matching protocol. This matching protocol retains one-shot nature
of a game, and moreover, it completely shuts off any channel of future cooperation among
participants (repeated game effects) by fully eliminating the chance of more than one interaction
between a given pair. We could have adopted the random-matching protocol, but that assigns a
very small (yet positive) probability to the event where a given pair of participants meets with
each other for more than one round. We wanted to avoid any such repeated game/reputation
effects. Since we were interested in the behavior of experienced participants, we let our
participants play the same game for 20 rounds.19
Second, we fixed the role (low or high cost type) of a participant in a session. This role
assignment process was adopted to eliminate any potential channel of cooperation among
participants. For example, if we had adopted a random role assignment process in each round,
then this could have introduced possibilities for cooperation in the following manner. A
participant assigned the role of a low-cost type in the current round may fear that harsh play now
18

The use of payoff tables in the laboratory experiments is by now a well-accepted methodological tool and its early
use can be found in Fouraker and Siegel (1963).
19

Since participants in our experiment decide about prices under the perfect-stranger matching protocol, we do not
worry about any repeated interactions that could give rise to coordination on higher prices as has been shown in a
theoretical study by Benoit & Krishna (1985).
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may lead to the development of a group norm that would be detrimental to him/her in future, as
on average half of the time s/he would be assigned the high-cost firm’s role. Hence, the random
role assignment process may not be the most conservative one to test one-shot Nash prediction as
it does not completely eliminate shadow of future cooperation and thereby does not reproduce
one-shot game conditions. Our choice of a fixed role assignment process avoids such a concern.
Third, we chose own market feedback as opposed to entire group feedback, which is
referred to in the experimental literature as the “maximum feedback”. Variations in feedback
have been shown to affect outcomes, sometimes drastically, in a variety of experimental market
games (see Altavilla et al., 2006; Offerman et al., 2002; Huck et al., 1999 for examples). Own
market feedback has been shown to induce competitive behavior in similar Bertrand
environments by precluding group dynamics (see Bruttel 2009; Dufwenberg and Gneezy, 2002).
Furthermore, we also implemented “zero perfect recall” by not making available information
about past earnings and choices to participants. This almost forces participants to focus only on
current round of play and not condition his current play on past profit conditions.
Fourth, we repeated the same game for 20 rounds in a session, unlike Dufwenberg and
Gneezy (2002, 2000) where each stage game was repeated for ten rounds. It could be argued that
20 rounds of play along with own-market feedback in our experiment may produce a reaction to
the information about average behavior of others. If a participant observes that others choose
prices above Nash prediction in a given treatment, this may cause prices to lie above the Nash
prediction in general. Therefore 20 rounds of play along with own-market feedback may not
necessarily cause participants to converge towards Nash play.20

20

We are thankful to an anonymous referee for this point.
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4. Results
The Aggregate Data
We start by discussing behavior in the first-round, because at this stage no element of
experience exists. The three first-round average winning prices, each based on 80 independent
price points, are 27.26, 24.64, and 15.75 in the Small-Diff, Medium-Diff, and Large-Diff,
respectively. No statistical test is needed to infer that the UES of the low-cost firm, which is 11
in all three treatments, was not achieved in the first round of any of the three treatments. Most
notably, the first-round average winning prices in the Small-Diff, Medium-Diff, and Large-Diff
treatments can be ranked in descending order of their magnitude of departure from the UES of
the low-cost firm.21
Since there are 80 independent first-round winning prices in each treatment, we perform a
standard t-test to check the null hypothesis of the equality of the average winning prices between
a given pair of treatments against the one-sided alternative hypothesis as reported in Table 2
along with the test results. For all three treatment pairs, we reject the respective null hypothesis.
Therefore, we conclude that before any learning has taken place, the average winning price in the
Small-Diff treatment is significantly higher than that of in the Medium-Diff treatment, and the
average winning price in Medium-Diff treatment is significantly higher than that of in the LargeDiff treatment.

21

We conducted two sessions of the Symmetric cost treatment, where both firms have a marginal cost of 11. The
average posted prices in these sessions are 39.56 and 39.27. The corresponding average winning prices are 36.14 and
35.66. A t-test for the equality of the average posted price in the symmetric treatment and the average posted price in
the Small-Diff treatment (against the alternative that the former is greater than the latter) yields a t-statistic of 17.21
(n = 1600 for Symmetric, and 3200 for Small-Diff). A t-test for the equality of the average winning price in the
symmetric treatment and the average winning price in the Small-Diff treatment (against the alternative that the
former is greater than the latter) yields a t-statistic of 15.83 (n = 800 for Symmetric, and 1600 for Small-Diff).
Needless to say, similar comparison between the Symmetric treatment and Medium-Diff or Large-Diff will produce a
larger t-statistic. We are thankful to an anonymous referee for bringing our attention to the Symmetric treatment.
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Figures 2 – 4 show the evolution of the session-specific average winning prices in the
Small-Diff, Medium-Diff, and Large-Diff treatment, respectively. Focusing on the dynamics of
price choices, we observe that by the final round the average winning prices in all three
treatments have mostly stabilized. Within each treatment, all session averages behave in the
same fashion over time. Therefore, the price behavior within a treatment seems to be broadly
invariant to any participant-specific shocks. The three average winning prices, based on the data
from all rounds, are 31.66, 25.30, and 15.27 in the Small-Diff, Medium-Diff, and Large-Diff,
respectively. Four important observations emerge. First, repetition of the stage game still
preserves the same ranking of the average winning prices, as already observed in the first-round
data. Second, the UES prediction is not borne by each treatment data. Third, the average winning
price is the highest in the Small-Diff, followed by the Medium-Diff and Large-Diff. Fourth, the
last-round average winning prices in the Small-Diff and Medium-Diff are considerably higher
than the UES of 11, whereas the last-round average winning price in the Large-Diff seems to
approach the UES. The last observation should discard concerns that fairness considerations
among participants may have generated our data. If this were the case, then we will not observe
close-to-the UES play in the Large-Diff treatment, which translates into large payoff inequality
between participants playing in the role of high- and low-cost firms. Figures 2 to 4 should also
assuage concerns about market-specific dynamics leading to very different behaviors (with the
possible exception of session 1 in Medium-Diff) in different treatments.
Strictly speaking, the perfect-stranger matching design makes observations of price
choices over-time non-independent, and therefore we have four observations per treatment,
where each observation is a session-specific average. We perform a nonparametric MannWhitney-Wilcoxon test based on the ranks for each of the three treatment pairs with the null
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hypothesis that for a given pair of treatments the average winning prices are statistically identical
against a one-sided alternative hypothesis. Test results are reported in Table 3. We reject each
null hypothesis in favor of the respective alternative hypothesis. We also perform a JonckheereTerpstra test to check if the average winning price in the Small-Diff treatment is higher than the
same in the Medium-Diff treatment, and the average winning price in the Medium-Diff treatment
is higher than the same in the Large-Diff treatment. The Jonckheere-Terpstra test result confirms
the above statistical conjecture. To test our main hypothesis that the posted price by the low-cost
firm will increase as the difference between the firms’ marginal costs narrows, we also
performed similar tests by using the average posted prices by the low-cost firm (Table 4).
Qualitatively similar results emerge. Thus, the data strongly indicate that there exists an inverse
relationship between the size of the cost asymmetry and the market price. This finding goes
against the standard prediction that pricing behavior in the asymmetric Bertrand duopoly model
is independent of the size of the cost asymmetry.
Table 5 reports the actual total profit earned by each type of firm in each of the three
treatments for 20 rounds of play.22 Recall that according to the theory: (1) the high-cost firm
should receive zero profit in each treatment, (2) the low-cost firm should make positive profit in
any of the equilibria in each game, and (3) the low-cost firm’s equilibrium profit is maximized at
the UES price in each treatment.
In the data, the actual profit earned by the high-cost firm in each treatment is, however,
far from zero. The high-cost firm’s average profit decreases as the size of the cost asymmetry
goes up. We also compute, for each treatment, the standard deviation of prices posted by the
high-cost firms. In the Small-Diff treatment, the first and last round standard deviations of prices

22

We compute the theoretical profit figures for the low-cost firm in each treatment by assuming that the low-cost
firm chooses a price of 11, which is the UES price for the low-cost firm.

16

are 8.81 and 7.40. The corresponding figures for the Medium-Diff and Large-Diff are 8.87 and
7.99, and 10.05 and 8.66, respectively. The respective figures for the other rounds, which we do
not report here, exhibit a clear trend of decrease over time. These figures provide evidence of a
clear decline in the volatility of prices by the high-cost firms.
The magnitude of the actual profit of the low-cost firm decreases as the size of the cost
asymmetry increases across treatments. In fact, the difference between the theoretical profit (as
per the UES prediction) and the average profit earned by the low-cost firm diminishes as the cost
asymmetry increases. Overall, the profit figures again negate the UES prediction. The average
earnings for participants playing in the role of low- and high-cost firm in Small-Diff, MediumDiff, and Large-Diff are approximately ($45, $12), ($37, $9), and ($25, $2), respectively,
excluding the show-up fee.

Individual & Market Data
The above analyses have established that different sizes of cost asymmetry generate
different levels of competitive behavior. However, all the evidence presented above is at an
aggregate level. One may, in addition, want to have an idea of composition effects. For instance,
the high average winning price in the Small-Diff treatment might be the combined result of
certain duopolies achieving cooperation at really high prices, while other duopolies playing the
UES. To shed light on the issue of whether we observe similar behavior across all the markets in
a given treatment, we plot the percentage deviation of market prices from the UES prediction for
each treatment. Figure 5 displays the evolution of these deviations for the Small-Diff, MediumDiff, and Large-Diff treatment, respectively. The vertical axis in each figure represents the
percentage deviation of actual winning price from the UES price of 11. The size of each circle in
these figures is proportional to the number of observations that fall in a specific percentage
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deviation category. The central observation that results from a careful inspection of figure 5 is
this: The magnitude of deviations of the winning prices from the UE price diminishes as we
move from Small-Diff treatment to Medium-Diff treatment followed by Large-Diff treatment.
Overall, these figures accord well with our earlier observation that there is an inverse
relationship between the size of the cost asymmetry and the number of markets that exhibit
higher percentage deviations from the UE price.

Distribution of Price Choices by Firm Type
Panel A in Figure 6 depicts the distribution of posted prices by the low-cost firms in each
treatment. Note that in each treatment there are 400 posted prices set by the low-cost firms. In
the Small-Diff treatment, less than 5% of all the prices belong to the price interval that includes
the UES of the low-cost firm. In contrast in the Medium-Diff treatment 21% of all the posted
prices and in the Large-Diff treatment about 43% of all the posted prices belong to the price
interval that includes the UES of the low-cost firm. Thus, the higher is the level of guaranteed
profit; the lower is the percentage of posted prices, set by the low-cost firms, which strictly
exceeds the UE price. Panel B in Figure 6 shows the distribution of posted prices set by the highcost firms in each treatment. First, we investigate how the high-cost firms’ preferences for high
prices correlate with the low-cost firms’ pricing preference in a given treatment. In the SmallDiff and Medium-Diff treatments, all the posted prices by the high-cost firms are strictly higher
than 10. In the Large-Diff treatment, 99% of the posted prices are strictly higher than 10. These
percentages may indicate that the high-cost firms realized the low-cost firms pricing incentive in
each treatment, and thus behaved accordingly. Second, there may be a concern that those
participants who played in the role of the high-cost firm may have chosen prices randomly upon
realization that they will make zero profit in any case. We examine this possibility. There are
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1600 prices chosen by all the high-cost firms in each treatment. The number of observations for
which the high-cost firm posts a price less than 11 in the Small-Diff and Medium-Diff treatments
is zero. The minimum posted prices by the high-cost firm in the Small-Diff and Medium-Diff
treatments are 11 and 12, respectively. For the Large-Diff treatment, there are a total of 6
observations for which a high-cost firm posted a price less than 11, and the minimum posted
price is 2. One may form a conjecture that since each participant’s role remained fixed
throughout a session, a high-cost firm may get frustrated and might vent their frustration by
occasionally choosing a price strictly less than c2 = 11. The above data, however, does not
support such a conjecture.
Similar behavioral trends across treatments can be detected when we focus on the
distribution of market wining prices. Figure 7 shows the distribution of market winning prices in
each treatment. An inspection of Figure 7 shows that there exists a positive relation between the
size of the cost asymmetry and the incidence of the UES play.
To sum up, our main result is that there exists an inverse relationship between the size of
the cost asymmetry and market price in asymmetric Bertrand duopolies. This lends sufficient
credibility to our argument that the low-cost firm’s behavior may be determined by the size of
the cost asymmetry.

5. Summary
The objective of this study was to provide experimental evidence regarding the predictive
power of Nash equilibrium (in undominated strategies) as applied to one-shot asymmetric
duopoly price competition model. Standard theory predicts that when duopolists have different
constant marginal costs (say, c1  c2), the low-cost firm should set a price just equal to c2 and
earn a profit equal to (c2 – c1). However, it is intuitively possible that the size of the cost
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asymmetry might determine the low-cost firm’s willingness to set a price equal to c2.
Specifically, we conjecture that as the size of the cost asymmetry decreases; the low-cost firm
would demonstrate a higher tendency to depart from the equilibrium strategy.
Contrary to the standard prediction and in accordance with our main hypothesis, the data
exhibit that as the cost difference between firms increases, the low-cost firm deviates less and
less from the UES strategy. It turns out that the market price on average becomes more
competitive as the cost difference increases. Expressed differently, when firms do not differ a
great deal from each other in terms of cost advantages, price competition actually lowers the
likelihood of lower prices. The potential for worse outcomes with a small difference in cost
efficiency may at first seem paradoxical. However, in view of our argument this result may offer
valuable insight about the nature of price competition under such market conditions.
So, how might our main finding inform competitive behavior in real markets? The
primary lesson is that firms with considerably greater cost advantages would drive costinefficient firms out of business whereas firms that are nearly equal in cost advantages would
sustain supracompetitive prices. However, it should be kept in mind that our results could also be
due to the abstract and artificial environment of laboratory experiments. On the theory side, our
results may highlight a possible weakness of economic models in which there is little incentives
for players to stick with equilibrium strategy. In this regard, we think our paper contributes to a
small but growing literature (specifically, marked by the contribution from Goeree and Holt,
2001) that tries to find game theoretic situations where a clear contradiction exists between Nash
equilibrium predictions and simple economic intuitions. Future research could attempt to test the
robustness of our main result in other market forms such as triopoly and quadropoly.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: We assume that 𝑝 stands for the posted price by L. Suppose the
unit cost of L increases from 𝐶𝐿𝐼 to 𝐶𝐿𝐼𝐼 , and the corresponding CDFs are given by 𝐹𝐿𝐼 (𝑝) and
𝐹𝐿𝐼𝐼 (𝑝). We need to show that if 𝐶𝐿𝐼 < 𝐶𝐿𝐼𝐼 in two different equilibria, then 𝐹𝐿𝐼 (𝑝) produces

stochastically lower prices for L, that is 𝐹𝐿𝐼 (𝑝) > 𝐹𝐿𝐼𝐼 (𝑝).
We begin by partially differentiating both sides of (5) in the main text with respect to 𝐶𝐿 .
𝜕𝐹 (𝑝)
𝐹𝐻 (𝑝) + (𝐶𝐿 − 𝑝) 𝐻
𝜕 𝑑𝐹𝐿 (𝑝)
𝑝 − (𝑝 − 𝐶𝐿 )𝐹𝐻 (𝑝)
𝜕𝐶𝐿
(
)={
]
} 𝐾 𝑒𝑥𝑝 [
𝜕𝐶𝐿
𝑑𝑝
µ
µ

Note that

𝜕
𝜕𝐶𝐿

𝑑𝐹𝐿 (𝑝)

𝜕𝐹𝐻 (𝑝)

𝑑𝑝

𝜕𝐶𝐿

(

) ≷ 0 ⟺ {𝐹𝐻 (𝑝) + (𝐶𝐿 − 𝑝)

(6)

} ≷ 0, as all other terms on the right

hand side of equation (6) are positive. We now investigate the sign of the expression
{𝐹𝐻 (𝑝) + (𝐶𝐿 − 𝑝)

𝜕𝐹𝐻 (𝑝)

𝜕𝐹𝐻 (𝑝)

𝜕𝐶𝐿

𝜕𝐶𝐿

}, which critically hinges on the sign of

It what follows we first show that in a logit equilibrium,
𝜕𝐹𝐻 (𝑝)
𝜕𝐶𝐿

≤ 0 ∀ 𝑝 ∈ [𝐶𝐿 , 𝑃]. Suppose, by contradiction, that

{𝐹𝐻 (𝑝) + (𝐶𝐿 − 𝑝)
𝜕

𝜕𝐹𝐻 (𝑝)

𝜕

𝜕𝐶𝐿

𝜕𝐶𝐿

𝑑𝐹𝐿 (𝑝)

condition 𝜕𝐶 (
𝐿

𝑑𝑝

𝜕𝐹𝐻 (𝑝)

} > 0, which implies that

𝜕𝐶𝐿

.

𝜕𝐹𝐻 (𝑝)
𝜕𝐶𝐿

< 0 ∀ 𝑝 ∈ [𝑃, 𝐶𝐿 ) and

> 0. Then we have ∀ 𝑝 < 𝐶𝐿 ,

𝑑𝐹𝐿 (𝑝)

(

𝑑𝑝

) > 0. In other words, the

) > 0 ∀ 𝑝 < 𝐶𝐿 implies that if 𝐶𝐿 increases, the firm assigns higher densities

(𝑓𝐿 (𝑝)) in the price range 𝑃 ≤ 𝑝 < 𝐶𝐿 . Now, according to (2), 𝑓𝐿 (𝑝) can increase only when
[exp[𝜋𝐿𝑒 (𝑝)⁄𝜇]] increases, i.e., 𝜋𝐿𝑒 (𝑝) increases. Since 𝜋𝐿𝑒 (𝑝) = [(𝑝 − 𝐶𝐿 )[1 − 𝐹𝐻 (𝑝)]], it
follows that for any given 𝑝 ∈ [𝑃, 𝐶𝐿 ), the term (𝑝 − 𝐶𝐿 ) has become more negative with the
increase in unit cost of L from 𝐶𝐿𝐼 to 𝐶𝐿𝐼𝐼 . Therefore, 𝜋𝐿𝑒 (𝑝) can increase (in other words, becomes
less negative) only if [1 − 𝐹𝐻 (𝑝)] decreases, i.e., the probability that H wins the market
increases, which can only happen if H decides to increase its densities in the range [𝑃, 𝐶𝐿 ).
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However, since 𝜋𝐻𝑒 (𝑝𝐻 ) = (𝑝𝐻 − 𝐶𝐻 )*[probability H wins the market], an increase in H’s
densities in the range [𝑃, 𝐶𝐿 ) means that 𝜋𝐻𝑒 (𝑝𝐻 ) would be more negative than before in the same
price range. This outcome contradicts equation (2), which states that for each firm density
increases with expected profit. As a result, the assumption that
establishes the first part our claim that

𝜕𝐹𝐻 (𝑝)
𝜕𝐶𝐿

𝜕𝐹𝐻 (𝑝)
𝜕𝐶𝐿

> 0 is void, which

< 0 ∀ 𝑝 ∈ [𝑃, 𝐶𝐿 ).

Now, we prove the second part of the proof, that is,

𝜕𝐹𝐻 (𝑝)
𝜕𝐶𝐿

≤ 0 ∀ 𝑝 ∈ [𝐶𝐿 , 𝑃]. Suppose,

following an increase in 𝐶𝐿 , if H reduces 𝑥 ∈ (0,1) amount of area by reducing its densities from
each 𝑝 ∈ [𝑃, 𝐶𝐿 ), then: (i) the same amount of area must be added to the other part of the
distribution (𝐹𝐻 (𝑝)) that lies in the range [𝐶𝐿 , 𝑃] (since the total area under the distribution must
be unity), and therefore (ii) some 𝑝 ∈ [𝐶𝐿 , 𝑃] will receive the added density. As such, the loss of
area 𝑥 to the left of the distribution: (a) may not be fully regained till 𝑝 becomes equal to 𝑃, in
𝜕𝐹𝐻 (𝑝)

which case

𝜕𝐶𝐿

< 0 ∀ 𝑝 ∈ [𝐶𝐿 , 𝑃) and

𝜕𝐹𝐻 (𝑝)

before 𝑝 becomes equal to 𝑃, in which case
condition

𝜕𝐹𝐻 (𝑝)
𝜕𝐶𝐿

𝜕𝐹𝐻 (𝑝)
𝜕𝐶𝐿

implies {𝐹𝐻 (𝑝) + (𝐶𝐿 − 𝑝)
𝜕

= 0 at 𝑝 = 𝑃, or, (b) may be fully regained

𝜕𝐹𝐻 (𝑝)
𝜕𝐶𝐿

≤ 0 ∀ 𝑝 ∈ [𝐶𝐿 , 𝑃]. Combining (a) and (b) the

≤ 0 ∀ 𝑝 ∈ [𝐶𝐿 , 𝑃] must hold.

Now given that

then 𝜕𝐶 (

𝜕𝐶𝐿

< 0 ∀ 𝑝 ∈ [𝑃, 𝐶𝐿 ), if the price posted by L is 𝑝 < 𝐶𝐿 , then it

𝜕𝐹𝐻 (𝑝)
𝜕𝐶𝐿

} < 0 (since 𝐹𝐻 (𝑝) is positive but very small). Thus if 𝑝 < 𝐶𝐿 ,

𝑑𝐹𝐿 (𝑝)

𝐿

𝑑𝑝

) < 0 (using (6)), which means when 𝐶𝐿 rises 𝜋𝐿𝑒 (𝑝) becomes more negative and

as a result L lowers its density ∀ 𝑝 ∈ [𝑃, 𝐶𝐿 ). Therefore, ∀ 𝑝 ∈ [𝑃, 𝐶𝐿𝐼𝐼 ), 𝐹𝐿𝐼𝐼 (𝑝) will be flatter
than 𝐹𝐿𝐼 (𝑝).
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On the other hand, if L posts a price 𝑝 ≥ 𝐶𝐿 , then {𝐹𝐻 (𝑝) + (𝐶𝐿 − 𝑝)
𝜕𝐹𝐻 (𝑝)
𝜕𝐶𝐿

≤ 0 ∀ 𝑝 ∈ [𝐶𝐿 , 𝑃]. Thus for 𝑝 ≥ 𝐶𝐿 ,

𝜕
𝜕𝐶𝐿

𝑑𝐹𝐿 (𝑝)

(

𝑑𝑝

𝜕𝐹𝐻 (𝑝)
𝜕𝐶𝐿

} > 0, since

) > 0 (using (6)), which implies when 𝐶𝐿

rises, L increases its density ∀ 𝑝 ∈ [𝐶𝐿 , 𝑃]. Therefore ∀ 𝑝 ∈ [𝐶𝐿𝐼𝐼 , 𝑃], the CDF of L will be steeper
when 𝐶𝐿 = 𝐶𝐿𝐼𝐼 compared to when 𝐶𝐿 = 𝐶𝐿𝐼 .
The above comparative statics results can also be understood with the aid of Figure 1.
When 𝐶𝐿 increases from 𝐶𝐿𝐼 to 𝐶𝐿𝐼𝐼 , the corresponding CDFs under the two cost situations can be
represented by 𝐹𝐿𝐼 (𝑝) and 𝐹𝐿𝐼𝐼 (𝑝), respectively. As drawn, 𝐹𝐿𝐼𝐼 (𝑝) will be flatter for 𝑝 ∈ [𝑃, 𝐶𝐿𝐼𝐼 )
and steeper for 𝑝 ∈ [𝐶𝐿𝐼𝐼 , 𝑃], in comparison to 𝐹𝐿𝐼 (𝑝). Therefore, 𝐹𝐿𝐼 (𝑝) must lie above 𝐹𝐿𝐼𝐼 (𝑝).
Finally, what if 𝐹𝐿𝐼 (𝑝) does not lie above 𝐹𝐿𝐼𝐼 (𝑝)? For example, assume that 𝐹𝐿𝐼𝐼 (𝑝)
intersects 𝐹𝐿𝐼 (𝑝) from below (not shown in the figure) at a price 𝑝 > 𝐶𝐿𝐼𝐼 . Then it must be the case
that for a certain (higher) range of prices, 𝐹𝐿𝐼𝐼 (𝑝) is flatter than 𝐹𝐿𝐼 (𝑝). However, this violates the
condition that for 𝑝 ∈ [𝐶𝐿𝐼𝐼 , 𝑃], 𝐹𝐿𝐼𝐼 (𝑝) is steeper than 𝐹𝐿𝐼 (𝑝). To sum it up, since 𝐹𝐿𝐼 (𝑝) always
lies above 𝐹𝐿𝐼𝐼 (𝑝), it implies that 𝐹𝐿𝐼 (𝑝) always produces stochastically lower prices, that is
𝐹𝐿𝐼 (𝑝) > 𝐹𝐿𝐼𝐼 (𝑝) ∀ 𝑝, which completes the proof. In addition, if Proposition 1 holds, market price
will also increase (in a probabilistic sense) when 𝐶𝐿 increases, for a given 𝐶𝐻 .
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Tables
TABLE 1
The Nash Equilibrium Predictions
Small-Diff (8,11)

Medium-Diff (6,11)

Large-Diff (4,11)

Nash
Equilibrium

Equilibrium
Payoff

Nash
Equilibrium

Equilibrium
Payoff

Nash
Equilibrium

Equilibrium
Payoff

(11, 12)

(3, 0)

(11, 12)

(5, 0)

(11, 12)

(7, 0)

Note: Within each parenthesis, the first number corresponds to the low-cost firm and the second
number corresponds to the high-cost firm.

TABLE 2
Tests for the First-Round Average Winning Prices
Null Hypothesis (H0)

Alternative Hypothesis (H1)

t-Statistic

Prob (T > t)

Decision

Small-Diff = Medium-Diff

Small-Diff > Medium-Diff

2.125

0.02

Reject H0

Small-Diff = Large-Diff

Small-Diff > Large-Diff

10.409

0.00

Reject H0

Medium-Diff = Large-Diff

Medium-Diff > Large-Diff

7.598

0.00

Reject H0

Note: There are 80 observations per treatment.
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TABLE 3
Nonparametric Tests of Average Winning Prices Based on All Round Data
Test

Mann-WhitneyWilcoxon Test
Statistic

z
(Prob > z)

Decision

Small-Diff vs. Medium-Diff

36

2.309
(0.0209)**

Small-Diff > Medium-Diff

Small-Diff vs. Large-Diff

36

2.309
(0.0209)**

Small-Diff > Large-Diff

Medium-Diff vs. Large-Diff

36

2.309
(0.0209)**

Medium-Diff > Large-Diff

Small-Diff vs. Medium-Diff
vs. Large-Diff

JonckheereTerpstra Test
Statistic = 108

If J > 40, test
statistic is significant
at 1% level

Small-Diff > Medium-Diff
> Large-Diff

Note: (i) The table represents session level statistical comparisons. The number of observations for each treatment is 4,
(ii) The session level average winning prices are (32.01, 31.59, 32.53, 30.51), (23.27, 25.81, 26.18, 25.93) and (16.78,
14.99, 14.58, 14.75) for Small-Diff, Medium-Diff and Large-Diff, respectively, (iii) Jonckheere-Terpstra test statistic in
this case is the sum of the pairwise Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test statistic.

TABLE 4
Nonparametric Tests of Average Posted Prices by the Low-Cost Firm
Test

Mann-WhitneyWilcoxon Test
Statistic

z
(Prob > z)

Decision

Small-Diff vs. Medium-Diff

36

2.309
(0.0209)**

Small-Diff > Medium-Diff

Small-Diff vs. Large-Diff

36

2.309
(0.0209)**

Small-Diff > Large-Diff

Medium-Diff vs. Large-Diff

36

2.309
(0.0209)**

Medium-Diff > Large-Diff

Small-Diff vs. Medium-Diff
vs. Large-Diff

JonckheereTerpstra Test
Statistic = 108

If J > 40, test
statistic is significant
at 1% level

Small-Diff > Medium-Diff
> Large-Diff

Note: (i) The table represents session level statistical comparisons. The number of observations for each treatment is 4,
(ii) The session level average posted prices are (36.07, 35.52, 36.24, 35.19), (28.59, 31.17, 31.26, 30.70) and (23.33,
23.63, 23.68, 23.62) for Small-Diff, Medium-Diff and Large-Diff, respectively, (iii) Jonckheere-Terpstra test statistic in
this case is the sum of the pairwise Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test statistic.
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TABLE 5
Actual Total Profit compared to UE Profit for 20 Rounds of Play by Firm Type
Small-Diff

Large-Diff

LCF

HCF

LCF

HCF

LCF

HCF

60

0

100

0

140

0

Session I

296.88

161.48

226.93

90.98

197.83

35.50

Session II

394.20

67.60

337.43

45.28

187.58

19.58

Session III

404.03

72.35

318.50

66.60

198.13

6.43

Session IV

359.23

75.35

294.88

80.63

199.83

7.88

363.59

94.20

294.44

70.87

195.84

17.35

UE Profit

Actual
Profit

Medium-Diff

Average Profit

Note: LCF stands for low-cost firm, and HCF stands for high-cost firm.

Figures
Figure 1: Equilibrium Choice Distribution of Prices for Low-Cost Firm
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Figure 2: Average Winning Price in Small-Diff Sessions

Figure 3: Average Winning Price in Medium-Diff Sessions

Figure 4: Average Winning Price in Large-Diff Sessions
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Figure 5: Percentage Deviation of Winning Price from the UE Price in Treatments
Small-Diff

Medium-Diff

Large-Diff

Note: The size of each scatter dot is proportional to the number of observations that fall in such category. Since the
number of observations per period is 80 (across all treatments), the sum total of areas of the scatter dots for each
period is constant.
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Figure 6 (Panel A): Distribution of Posted Prices by Low-Cost Firm

Figure 6 (Panel B): Distribution of Posted Prices by High-Cost Firm

Figure 7: Distribution of Market Winning Prices
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